

WORLD PEACE REPORT

An attempt to share information on the causes and available cures of international war.

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THINK MORE

If the US has lost anything it is its ability to innovate, to make things better and cheaper. We cannot substitute wizardry in finance, economics, personnel, and speculation. The justification for capitalism lies in its ability to reward all the populace — the consumer, the worker, the management, and the proprietor. When a product is redesigned for greater value, by reducing its cost and by improving its performance, all can be enriched.

The cures for our relations with Japan represent a dreary litany. Any unbiased judgment must admit the Japanese work harder, produce more economically, innovate more cleverly, and have discovered that commercial considerations may supersede consumer welfare.

The US must face the need to work harder and to innovate more — it will not be easy and it will take time. As demonstrated in the next paragraph, this cure is far from hopeless. Our ability to discover new product designs is still supreme, but we do not apply the equivalent imagination to commercializing the discovery.

Reuben M. Greenberg, the black chief of police of Charleston, South Carolina, since 1982, wrote "Less Bang-Bang for the Buck: The Market Approach to Crime Control" for *Policy Review*, Winter 1992, published by the Heritage Foundation. It is a heartwarming article, demonstrating how good thinking, even cleverness, cured two severe local problems. Standards have been established for nationwide applications.

The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in crime in most American cities.... In Charleston, South Carolina, we are reversing the national trend. During 1989, we had the lowest number of burglaries in the city since 1958. We also had the fewest armed robberies in a quarter century, the lowest number of auto thefts in 27 years, and the lowest number of larcenies in 22 years.... The crime rate fell by 40 percent from 1982 to 1989....

In Charleston, 8 percent of our population lives in public housing. Yet public housing residents and their visitors are responsible for only 1.8 percent of all armed robbery, rape, homicide, assault, larceny, arson, and auto theft crimes.... Public housing is now one of the safest places in Charleston to live in.

We were able to decrease crime and make our neighborhoods safe with little expense and relatively few arrests by just paying attention to one simple principle: a market-based approach to law enforcement.

The first target in our war on crime was street-level

drug dealing.... It didn't take us long to realize that merely arresting dealers would not stop the street-level drug dealing.... The location where he had been selling the drugs was just too profitable. Once he was out of the way, some other person would take his place.... It soon became clear to us that the solution was not to go after the dealer but to go after his market and to make it unprofitable.

First, we identified 31 locations where drugs were sold in Charleston.... This time, instead of using four or five officers in an undercover operation with a sophisticated intelligence van, we tried something simple, very economical, and as it turned out, very effective. We assigned one uniformed officer to stand with the drug dealer at his corner.

The officer stood about 40 feet away.... We were there to put a crimp on their business by scaring off their customers.

These drug dealers had been arrested many, many times.... But most of their customers had not been arrested, did not really understand how the criminal justice system worked, and did not want to learn.

Our program had an immediate impact.... No one came near the drug dealer, even to say hello. All of the automobiles that came to the area would drive by the first time, come around a second time, and leave. In order to assist us, we added a weapon to our arsenal: a Polaroid camera with a flash. When these drivers would come by the second time we would take their photograph. And that would be the last that we saw of that particular customer....

The drug dealers could not move too far from their established base of operation because they had no way of communicating their new location to their customers.

There was another very important reason as well. As one drug dealer told us, "You can get killed trying to move someplace else." After all, that's what turf wars are all about....

We learned very quickly that we didn't have to cover these areas seven days a week. We would cover them on those days the drug dealers made the greatest profit — Wednesday through Saturday.

We didn't have to cover them 24 hours a day. All we had to do to really have an impact on their business was to cover them from about 6:00 in the evening until about 2:00 in the morning in most places.

After two or three weeks — which was much sooner than we originally thought — these dealers left. They could no longer make a living selling drugs at that location....

After four to five weeks, just one officer could cover

three or four locations, freeing the other officers to go elsewhere....

The cleanup of the area was very important. If you are going to convince people ... that an area is safe, it has to look safe.... The cleanup was essential, and unfortunately, we had to do it ourselves....

We got prisoners out of the jail to pick up trash. By chance, some of them had been in prison for street-level drug dealing, and, also by chance, some had been dealing in those very same areas to which they were now taken to clean up. It was interesting to see the reactions of the people in the neighborhood to seeing these dealers, who weeks or months before were loaded down with gold chains and all kinds of apparent wealth, now wearing orange jumpsuits that said, "County Jail" on them. [Pp. 56-58]

The second problem was in Charleston's public housing, rife with crime:

We found that the people living in public housing were more often the victims of criminal activity than the perpetrators of it. Criminals concentrated in those areas because our forces did not patrol heavily in public housing projects, leaving residents an easy target....

We added foot patrols and other kinds of patrols, and they were modestly effective. But finally we came upon the real solution. And that was to develop a kind of public housing that would be fundamentally different than public housing anywhere else, and at the same time similar to much of the private housing that exists in our country. [P. 59]

Rather unexpectedly, agencies such as the ACLU, the neighborhood legal systems, and the housing authority were all cooperative with the law enforcement people.

We decided to screen people who went into public housing.... Public housing officials ... allowed convicted felons ... access to public housing with no restrictions whatsoever. The only place in our city where people had to live with convicted criminals was public housing.... Other landlords could keep them out.

We also decided to evict anyone who was engaging in illegal activities.... We did not require that the perpetrator be convicted in a criminal court; we simple went after him in a civil court. After all, that's what an eviction is; it is a civil action, where the individual has violated the terms of his or her lease. All we had to do, for example, was to prove that we had found cocaine in the dresser drawer in the second bedroom during the execution of a search warrant....

Out of the 8,000 residents, we ... have had to evict only about 80 individuals or families.

We didn't have to evict nearly as many people as originally thought, because public housing tenants stopped engaging in criminal activity.

At 7:00 on Saturday nights, we set up a roadblock ... in front of a Section 8 housing project called Bayside, where there was a serious drug problem. Nobody was allowed into the complex without permission from the tenant he had come to visit.... We found that the vast majority of people who came to Bayside at night were non-residents. They were criminal predators who came to sell drugs or engage in other illegal activities. By eliminating their presence, we eliminated much of the

crime in our Section 8 housing.... It turned out that some of the visitors to Bayside were people we had been looking for.... We arrested a murderer, burglars, drunk drivers, and many drug dealers. We ended up killing a lot of birds with one well-placed stone.

We accomplished [all of] this without massive increases in manpower, money, or other resources, and without overburdening the jails or other parts of the criminal justice system. All we had to do was look at street crime and drug dealing as a business, and fight it by reducing the profit margin until the business was no longer worthwhile to operate. Criminals, just like everyone else, respond to market forces. We just needed to show them that, literally, crime doesn't pay. [Pp. 59-60]

Our real resources must come from thinking; they cannot be purchased.

We would be happy if our readership furnished us with similar demonstrations for publication in the *WPR*. They must show novel improvements, major benefits, and minor costs.

ALGERIA

I have assiduously cut out articles about Algeria from the *New York Times* since 12/12/91, when Youssef M. Ibrahim first wrote about the probable strength of the Moslem fundamentalists in the forthcoming parliamentary elections.

The Islamic Salvation Front was the clear winner of the voting held on 12/26/91. Two weeks later the Algerian army took control, canceled the runoff elections, and arrested the leaders. Iran severely criticized the action.

Most paradoxically, a democratic election was won by a force that rejects democracy; every Moslem state professing fundamentalism is run by a dictatorship. Yet the election result in Algeria is not unique. Hitler also won a democratic election. We would like to say, "What went wrong?" but why should we question the clearly democratic outcome? In the case of Algeria, there is also a possibility that, by a two-thirds vote, the existing constitution can be amended to ensure future domination by the Moslem fundamentalists — for instance, by replacing secular law with Koranic law (sharya).

In his article of 1/19/92 Ibrahim describes how "Algeria, freed from France in 1962, came to this state":

— While the society was experiencing an explosion of new needs in the last 30 years, the once-revolutionary leadership was only making itself more comfortable.

— Since 1962, Algeria has had one of the most rapid population explosions anywhere, growing from 7 million people to 26 million. Despite impressive reserves of oil and natural gas, the country is saddled with \$25 billion in foreign debts.

— Nearly 30 percent of the population is unemployed.

— The once-idealistic men who 35 years ago united to end the French occupation have become encrusted in power and deeply divided by bitter feuds.

— *The elite mouthed slogans about egalitarianism and socialism but all the while enshrined their own privileges. Anyone who fought in the war of liberation could get tax-free imports, preferential housing and special rights to travel. These benefits were made hereditary.*

— *Oil prices fell a decade ago. What was left of Algeria's revenues was used to keep the new privileged class comfortable. Investments in school, housing, medical care, agriculture and even the vital oil industry have stopped.*

— *University education has broken down, in large part because of a split between French-speaking teachers and the broad mass of Arab-speaking students.*

— *One million people at most are living within what we call civilized norms, which means that they have fairly decent salaries.... The rest of the population are at or below subsistence levels.*

The prime minister appointed by the army, Sid Ahmad Ghozali, claims, "It may take 15 years to give everyone a house, a job, and a decent living. But we should quickly, within a year, give our youth hope they can have these things. Hope cannot wait."

Suppose we observed the possibility of another regime overthrow by a non-democratic force, utilizing the democratic process. What are available strategies?

— First, as Ghozali advocated, ensure a functioning democracy, free of favoritism and without an enshrined bureaucracy.

— Seek a high election turnout; 40 percent of the Algerian electorate did not vote, cementing the victory of the militant Moslems.

— Establish rules for political parties, such as internal democracy, revelations of financial support, and publication of internal election and meeting results.

— Prohibit the advocacy of religious law in place of temporal law.

The democracies win and lose. According to Freedom House's *Freedom Review* of 2/92, the Not Free populations diminished, from 1/90 to 1/91 to 1/92, from 39 percent to 33 percent to 32 percent of world population. The treaty of San Salvador with its guerilla ties, on 1/16/92, after a 12-year civil war, was a prize reflecting the efforts of many world leaders. Chile went from a democracy to a communist state, to a dictatorship, and back to a democracy. Yet, we must never underestimate the powers of dictators and the vulnerabilities of the democracies. Only by the anticipation of destructive forces and the perfection of its behavior will democracy ensure its viability.

NATIONALISM AND ETHNICS

The world has approximately one hundred ethnic groups, characterized by some portion of the population having sought separation from the dominating nation-state. The expressed reasons for the desired divorce range from claims of discrimination and exploitation to the preservation of tradition, language, and religion.

Presumably to bind up some loose ethnicities, two democracies were formed at the end of WWI — Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Both are now undergoing strong separatist movements and it is likely we will have six nations where we had two. The demise of the USSR has left twelve somewhat independent nations, each of which contains some recalcitrant ethnic groups. As the result of past wars and migrations, each of the six "East European" countries now has claims on its neighbors.

To what extent should the satisfaction of ethnics be allowed to divert the nation-state from the pursuit of its national objectives? How should the nationalist balance the satisfaction of ethnic needs with the support of the larger state — which makes possible higher levels of security and social benefits?

The *raison d'être* of the nation-state is the improvement of the welfare of its population; usually, there is no serious diversion for ethnic considerations. Which is more important, the welfare of the nation or the welfare of the separatist group? All too often, it appears, the ethnic claims only represent a solipsistic pride, a recollection of ancient glories either exaggerated or nonexistent.

If at all possible, ethnic groups should pursue regulations which ensure non-discrimination of minorities and make a maximum contribution to the overall welfare by supporting the nation-state.

YESTERDAY AND TOMORROW

"What accounts for Today?"

I answered "Yesterday" and received an approving nod. Yet a nod the other way was an indication that there was more to the story. "Tomorrow," it turns out, would have been just as valid an answer.

Tomorrow implies the desirability of a situation that is made possible by what is done Today. Our objectives for the future govern the acts and decisions that currently engage us. Since there can be no absolute conviction about the results, we deal in probabilities.

To claim Yesterday established Today is to invoke strict causality. The events, the physical forces, even the objectives of yesterday created the scene we now observe. There is no longer any probability involved — today's events are *totally* accounted for by yesterday's; nothing happens without precedents.

When our actions are governed by future objectives, we are often driven by subconscious considerations; when our actions are governed by past events, we are more likely to explain them by logical or scientific reasoning.

We could relatively easily use a computer to simulate Yesterday and logically derive Today. But to derive Today from Tomorrow is much more difficult — we would have to model tomorrow's objective and then delineate how best to respond to the great variety in the environment which appears Today.

All this is another view of our "Evolution and the Nation-State," touted in the *WPR* of 12/91, available on request.

ECONOMICS UNBOUND

The world commodity markets have enjoyed (or suffered?) entirely unanticipated effects from the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

A report by Matthew L. Wald in the *New York Times*, 1/12/92, describes the flood of exports from the republics that severely depressed world commodity prices. Reductions of about 20 percent are evident in gold, platinum, aluminum, urea fertilizer, and uranium yellowcake.

In some cases stockpiles, mostly for military reserves, are being "dehoarded." The republics desperately need hard currency and undercut each other in pricing to the west. The only exception, of the major Russian export commodities, is oil — difficult to store and currently subject to production and transportation difficulties.

Many western corporations, having suffered both price and volume deteriorations, are distressed by the Soviet competition. But, since the addition of Soviet competition, world prices are lower for all commodities from raw materials to finished products. Inflation has been retarded and costs of living reduced. The markets are less subject to manipulation and more responsive to supply and demand.

Although the Soviet dismemberment is not without drawbacks, we observe world economic improvement, the removal of military considerations from hoarding strategies, and the increase in the competition which determines world commodity pricing.

ASSAD CASE

This is the title of an article by Michael Widlanski in *The New Republic*, 2/3/92. The humor ends with the pun.

I don't know how many readers are aware of how deeply Syria is involved in illegal drug trade with the United States, but I was quite ignorant of Widlanski's revelations.

Why is Syria so attached to Lebanon? ... The answer is drugs. Like Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad is a military commander who has tied his government to the lucrative drug trade.... George Bush went after Noriega ... [but he] seems to have no desire to challenge Assad, an ascetic, careful leader who uses drugs as an instrument of policy to raise much needed foreign currency for his ailing economy and keep the reins on rival militias in Lebanon.

Between 20 percent and 35 percent of the heroin imported into the United States comes from Syrian-occupied Lebanon. The red-tipped poppy plants flourish in the rich effluvial soil of the Bekaa Valley, which ... has been turned into one huge drug hothouse. The Drug Enforcement Administration estimated in 1989 that the value of the Lebanese drug trade was between \$700 million and \$1 billion — \$500 million of which went into Syrian hands....

When the Syrians first moved into Lebanon in 1975 ... Lebanon produced only about 100 tons of hashish per year. By 1985 hashish production had increased twentyfold, to 2,000 tons a year.... In 1986 Lebanese

hashish accounted for 75 percent of world production. But the Syrians figured out a better way to utilize the land mass of a country smaller than Massachusetts. They imported Turkish and Iranian experts to help gradually transform the drug fields from hashish to opium, which reaps more than ten times the price of hashish per acre.... Ten percent of the Bekaa Valley was under drug cultivation ten years ago. An estimated 90 percent is today.

Lebanese émigré families in South America ... import coca base, refine it, and then transship it to Europe and the United States. It is no accident that the main US port of entry for Syrian-Lebanese drug products is Detroit, where there are also many Syrian-Lebanese families.

The United States has done nothing to hinder this amazing growth industry.... When the Syrian leader sent several thousand soldiers to "fight" in the Gulf war, President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker decided to overlook the Syrian de facto annexation of Lebanon including the massacre of 700 Christian militiamen. They also decided to overlook Syria's drug dealing. The language of a recent State Department narcotics report is breathtakingly naive: "... US officials believe that individual Syrian soldiers and other officials ... as well as some higher level military officials, are involved in the drug trade. This is in contradiction to the stated Syrian government policy and such individuals are subject to prosecution if the government is presented with evidence against them."

The United States does more than overlook Syrian drug running. It actually invited Syrian army officers — and these are the drug pushers — on an intimate guided tour of US drug war installations.... The administration's penchant for sharing sensitive intelligence with Syria is nothing new: more than a year ago Baker naively "confronted" Assad with top secret intelligence data on Syrian terrorist operations — thereby sentencing to death two undercover Israeli agents to whom the intelligence was traced.

Assad has collected American aid dollars for the "destruction" of drug crops — rumors put the amount as high as \$400 million per year — while actually increasing the number of acres farmed for drugs.... Senior Syrian officers get their own cut of the drug take by collecting "taxes" on crop yields, ... issuing limited travel permits ... and granting crosscountry multi use permits.... The United States and Israel have samples of travel permits — signed by top Syrian officials — allowing traffickers to move in and out of Lebanon and Syria without being searched or having merchandise confiscated. [Pp. 8-9]

These permits have been signed by Syria's minister of defense (who gets an annual salary bonus of one gold bar), Assad's brother and his two nephews, the chief of Syria's intelligence in Lebanon, the chief of army intelligence, and Assad's personal administrative assistant.

George Bush asserted last year that "the international drug trade is a threat to our national security and the security and stability of other nations." In Syria's case, it seems, he's willing to make an exception. [P. 10]

How can we reconcile ourselves to enriching an outright scoundrel at the cost of our own degradation?